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Introduction 
The bilateral relationship between Japan and China is often characterised as one of ‘cold 
politics’ and ‘hot economics’; the economic relationship continues to boom while historical 
issues and political tensions continue to strain the relationship. 
 After six years of suspended visits between leaders from 2001 to 2006, the period 
since late 2006 has seen an effort by both sides to mend relations, perhaps in recognition of 
the growing importance of their economic relationship. Since normalisation of diplomatic 
relations in 1972 and the period of the contemporary economic relationship since 1979, 
political tensions have at times deteriorated while the economic relationship continued to 
prosper. 
 Do political events have any effect on the trade relationship? Does increased trade 
and trade dependence cause countries to get along better? Or do the increased interactions 
through trade, or asymmetry in trade such as that seen in the United States–China case, 
cause political distance to widen and conflict to rise? 
 The view that increased trade and economic interdependence will result in a nar-
rowing political distance is shared by many scholars and policy makers.1 There is also a 
view that increased imbalance in trade and economic interdependence will cause political 
tensions to rise. 
 This paper investigates the relationship between trade and political distance between 
China and Japan. The literature that studies the relationship between interstate relations 
(geopolitical relations) and economics (predominantly trade) use the terms ‘conflict’ and 
‘cooperation’ to describe political distance.2 A political conflict is a widening of political 
distance and a cooperative event is a narrowing of political distance. 
 The paper looks at Japan’s and China’s relationships with their other major trading 
partner, the United States, as points of comparison. The expectation is that the economic 
relationship is interdependent with how well countries are getting along. The Japan–China 
relationship is expected to be different from both the United States–China and the United 
States–Japan relationships, the latter of which is a lot more stable politically. 
 Although the probability of war, or high-intensity conflict, between Japan and China 
is low, there are occasional flash points in the relationship such as Taiwan, disputed territo-
rial claims and the legacy of history that have the potential to escalate. Extreme conflict 
(economic and trade sanctions, or even war) and high- level cooperation (such as through 
a customs union or security alliance) are at the opposite ends of the spectrum in a scale of 
conflict or cooperation events. These extremes do not occur in the China–Japan relationship 
over the period analysed in this study, but the relationship is one of low-intensity conflict 
and cooperation.
3
No. 386, 2010
 China’s relationship with its other major trading partner, the United States, is also 
complicated but does not perhaps share the historical complexity of the Japan–China re-
lationship. The asymmetry in trade flows, stemming from the growing US bilateral trade 
deficit with China, has strained relations from time to time. On the other hand, the mutual 
recognition of the importance of the relationship, and the increased trade and interdepend-
ence, is causing the two to negotiate their way through the imbalance carefully and there 
are substantial efforts to keep relations stable. 
 A political distance variable is created in this study (consistent with other studies) 
by subtracting a scale of conflict from cooperation. Although not all events or news in the 
data are created by the actions of authorities on either side, and many are instead events 
that are a product of independent actors, they all have some positive or negative political 
impact. Thus, the index of net cooperation derived from the record of these events can 
serve as a measure of the political distance between the two countries in the study.
 An alternative political distance variable, net conflict, which is a measure of conflict 
minus cooperation, is commonly used in the literature (Schneider et al., 2003). This dif-
ferencing of the two variables imposes some limitations and assumptions on the event 
data and can potentially alter results, and is discussed later. A distinction is made between 
trade and economic interdependence in this study and, unlike in previous studies, both 
are tested for their correlation with the variables of net cooperation. 
 The study uses monthly data up to 2004, whereas previous studies (such as Reu-
veny, and Kang, 1998) for other countries have used quarterly data, analysed much earlier 
periods and not examined the relationship between Japan and China. Sub-periods of the 
data are analysed for the Japan–China relationship to capture any changing dynamics in 
the trade–cooperation relationship. 
 The next section sets out the main arguments in the trade-political distance debate 
and then reviews some of the growing empirical evidence supporting various arguments. 
The section after that provides a description and explanation of the political distance and 
trade data. Then the following section explains the Granger causality model, presents 
the estimation results and discusses other tests that were carried out for finding a robust 
relationship between the variables. Finally, the implications of the analysis are discussed 
before concluding. 
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Trade, conflict and cooperation 
There has been a rich debate for centuries about the link between political distance and 
economic interdependence (Mansfield and Pollins, 2003). In the last few decades, the 
debate has seen the growth of a vast amount of systematic empirical analysis which has 
added to the understanding of the issue but there remain many unanswered questions 
(Mansfield and Pollins, 2001). The broad line of thinking associated with the ‘liberal’ 
school is that as trade and interdependence between nations grow, there is a greater op-
portunity cost to conflict and so the chances of conflict are reduced. Another view point, 
associated with the realist school, argues that countries also go to war to acquire resources 
as an alternative to international trade. In addition, it is argued that asymmetries in trade 
relationships can cause tensions to rise. These views, and the supporting empirical evidence, 
are briefly reviewed below, as are other factors affecting the link between political distance 
and economic interdependence such as the proximity of countries and the level of their 
political liberalisation. 
 Economic interdependence can mean vulnerability towards another nation (for 
example, through exposure to a dominant resource or strategic goods supplier) and/or 
sensitivity to dependence (for example, through the effect of economic shocks such as 
inflation or exchange rate volatility in one country on another) and quite often trade flows 
are the best quantitative measure of these independencies that are available.3 There is, of 
course, a high correlation between trade and interdependence, as a large component of 
interdependence is due to trade; but interdependence will generally include other forms 
of trade, such as in services, as well as the flow of people and investment.
 As early as 1748 Montesquieu, the French social commentator and political thinker, 
famously said: 
 Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become recipro-
cally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling: and 
thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities. -de Secondat (1748 [1989]: 316). 
 This is an insight that is often quoted in studies of interdependence and political 
distance. The basic idea is that mutual dependence leads to increased cooperation and a 
decrease in hostilities, or conflict. A narrowing of political distance has a positive relation-
ship with interdependence or trade. This is an oft-cited and good characterisation of the 
liberal school of thought.
 Trade flows are influenced significantly by broad political relations of amity and en-
mity between nations (Pollins, 1989b). The argument for a positive relationship between 
trade and cooperation runs both ways: trade fosters peace and peace fosters trade. As trade 
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increases between two countries, the opportunity cost of conflict rises. Trade is seen as 
being driven by those fundamentals such as differences in factor endowments, but also 
significantly influenced by politics and the political distance between nations (Mansfield 
and Pollins, 2003). It is easy to see that allies may trade more and sign trade agreements 
(for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement) whereas in general, countries 
reduce or stop trade with their enemies (for example, the United States and Cuba).
 Countries, and the actors within those countries that engage in trade, do so because 
they gain from it and it is in their interest to do so. Disputes and a widening of political 
distance may lead to a loss in trade and therefore a loss in welfare. Highly interdependent 
states rarely engage in full-blown war because the costs of doing so are too high. 
 Hirschman describes the politics of foreign trade and notes that there is ‘the possibility 
of using trade as a means of political pressure…in the pursuit of power’ (1945: xvi). The 
gains from trade between nations can have unequal distribution within countries as well 
as between countries (Hirschman, 1945). This unequal distribution of gains from trade 
can lead to a change in the structure of power within a country and between countries. 
Therefore, asymmetry in the gains from trade, which occurs quite naturally and regularly, 
can lead to a widening of political distance between countries and to high-intensity con-
flict in extreme cases especially if it causes a shift in power relations (Gilpin, 1981; Levy, 
1989; Mearsheimer, 1990). Such views are representative of the realist school of thought. 
Liberal and realist views are not mutually exclusive, however, as a good example of the 
comfortable co-existence of the liberal and realist schools is Richard Nixon’s opening up 
to China. Nixon was known as a realist but his opening up of relations with China was a 
liberal prescription. 
 An example of conflict (mainly low-intensity conflict) arising from asymmetric trade 
is the case of the United States and the trade disputes it has with some of its largest trade 
partners — Japan in the 1980s and the recent United States–China tensions over a rapidly 
growing bilateral trade imbalance. 
 There have been other characteristics identified that influence political distance. 
Countries with elected democracies, it is argued, do not go to war with each other4 
(Kant, 1795; Wright, 1942); and there are ambiguous effects of enduring rivalries on the 
trade–political distance relationship. 
 Distance is very important in analysing the link between political distance and eco-
nomic interdependence (O’Loughlin, 1993; Robst et al., 2006). On one hand, distance is 
an important determinant of trade and has been used extensively in gravity models of trade 
since Tinbergen (1962) to explain trade dependence. On the other hand, closer coun-
tries interact more with each other and neighbours tend to have more disputes (Vasquez, 
1995). Further, neighbours may be more likely to have enduring rivalries (Stinnett and 
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Diehl, 2001). The origin of such neighbourhood rivalries can include territorial disputes, 
disputes from increased trade (the closer countries are, the higher trade is, on average, as 
the gravity model attests) and the ability of countries to wage war on a neighbour as op-
posed to a distant country. 
 Of course, countries that trade often have many interactions and it is easy to see 
how even the closest of allies have disputes and low-intensity conflict from time to time. If 
the relationship of two countries is secure economically, incentives to create low-intensity 
conflict for domestic political reasons can arise. In fact, trade, or the threat of restric-
tions on trade, can be used as a signal to resolve disputes and avoid more serious conflict 
(Gartzke et al., 2001); so it is possible that trade can reduce military conflicts but increase 
non-military conflict, ‘particularly if one country is more hesitant to fight’ (Robst et al., 
2006: 4). From this perspective, interdependence may foster a high degree of low-intensity 
conflict that is less likely to escalate (Gartzke, 1998).
 To complicate matters, history is littered with counter-examples of adversaries trading 
during war time and countries changing the way they interact with the rest of the world. At 
first it is counter-intuitive to think of a widening of political distance or a negative action 
towards another country causing trade to increase, but there are examples in history, such 
as when Commodore Perry forced a then closed Japan to open its ports to international 
trade. Such examples are not common but are not anomalies.
 Many studies do not recognise that the nature of the complex interactions between 
trade (or interdependence more broadly) and political distance change over time, both 
in intensity and direction, and that the relationship may depend on both domestic and 
international factors (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001). 
Empirical evidence 
Polachek (1978) was the first to analyse the relationship between trade and political dis-
tance with a cross-section study of the effect of trade on conflict. He found that increased 
trade reduces political distance, thus finding evidence of the liberal view. Polachek (1980) 
constructed a model from microeconomic foundations in an important paper showing 
the negative relationship between conflict and trade. His work generated a proliferation 
of empirical papers testing both realist and liberal theories. 
 While Polachek (1978) accounted for causality running from trade to political dis-
tance, Pollins (1989a, 1989b) is often recognised as the first to show the effect of political 
distance on trade in a single equation cross-section study. The importance of causality both 
ways between trade (or interdependence) and political distance has been recognised since 
Polachek (1980), and two-staged least squares regression models are used to estimate 
these relationships. Reuveny and Kang (2003) and Polachek (1997) have since derived 
7
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simultaneous equations models.
 Barbieri and Schneider (1999) contains a summary table of the main findings of the 
most significant empirical work in the field. It is clear from their review in the table that 
the results are mixed, methodologies are wide ranging, the countries covered differ, and 
in general, the time periods analysed are wide ranging. As Mansfield and Pollins (2001) 
make clear, conclusions often do not have sensible boundaries and are, more often than 
not, imprecisely stated as generalisations. 
 The most common political distance Data-sets used are events data such as the Co-
operation and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), 
and war Data-sets such as Militarised Interstate Disputes (MID) data, the latter of which 
are compiled by the Correlates of War Project. There is a stream in the literature testing 
the compatibility of many of these measures, the biases in the coding (King and Lowe, 
2003) and whether these measures accurately reflect reality (Pevehouse, 2003). One such 
example shows the high level of compatibility between the COPDAB and WEIS Data-sets 
(Reuveny and Kang, 1996). 
 Barbieri (1996) finds strong evidence of economic interdependence increasing the 
likelihood of militarised interstate disputes. She finds this applies to symmetric as well as 
asymmetric interdependence between nations. In her study, the only form of interdepend-
ence that seems to mitigate conflict is low to moderate interdependence. Her data for con-
flicts is from 1870 to 1938 and she may have captured the different nature of interactions 
between countries in a different time from now. That was a time of imperial and colonial 
expansion and a less globalised world. 
 Robst et al. (2006) estimate the effects of geographical distance on political distance 
separately and find that trade reduces conflict to a greater extent when two countries are 
geographically close, but trade has a greater effect on cooperation when countries are 
distant. Closer countries have more interactions and there is more chance of territorial 
disputes and regional rivalries — both of which are relevant in analysing Japan and China. 
Robst et al. (2006) also find that proximity increases the number and severity of both 
conflict and cooperation events more among non-trading countries than countries with 
large trade. Their second finding does not relate to the study here, as Japan and China are 
close but trade is large. Robst et al. do find that although ‘proximity provides incentives 
for conflict, trade mitigates these incentives’ (2006: 5). 
 The literature suggests that the causality is bilateral-relationship dependent and the 
existence of causality often reciprocal — if political distance affects trade from country 
X to Y, then often political distance will affect trade from country Y to X (Reuveny and 
Kang, 1998). If no causality is found in one direction of a bilateral relationship, then it is 
likely that no causality exists in the other direction.
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 Results in the literature also point to causality running in different directions in dif-
ferent bilateral trade relationships, and the interactions depend on the type of traded good 
(for example, strategic goods versus non-strategic goods) (Reuveny and Kang, 1998). 
 Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982) and Reuveny and Kang (1996) test for Granger 
causality between conflict and trade using time series data. Gasiorowski and Polachek 
(1982) analyse Warsaw pact countries’ trade with the United States and find relatively 
little evidence of Granger causality. Reuveny and Kang (1996) look at some of the most 
important and politically and economically significant relationships from the 1960s to early 
1990s, concluding that the Granger causality is dependent on the relationships analysed 
and tends to be reciprocal. Similar methodology is used here for the Granger causality tests 
but with monthly data instead of quarterly data, with fewer relationships covered but in 
more detail.
 To understand better how politics can affect trade, we take a look at an extreme 
case. A widening of political distance leading to a trade embargo or war will obviously 
affect trade adversely. The other extreme is that a customs union or high-level economic 
cooperation will increase trade. How does low-level political distance affect trade relations? 
A one-off territorial dispute may have little direct effect on trade, but it adds to perceived 
trade risk and increases overall country risk. The cumulative effects of continued low-
intensity conflict will add to negative perceptions of, and attitudes towards, that country 
and over time political distance may widen. At the margin, it is to be expected that this 
can make a significant difference in the decision to undertake trade and other economic 
transactions. 
 Increased trade can foster cooperation and peace. Increased imbalances in trade or 
a shift in power relations sometimes due to trade can cause political distance to widen. 
Hence there is a feedback relationship from trade to political distance and vice versa. The 
implications of imbalanced and balanced trade will be important for the different cases of 
United States–China, where trade is largely imbalanced and United States–Japan, where 
trade is relatively balanced.  
 The literature reveals the interaction of political distance and economic relations is 
a complex one that depends on the countries, the symmetry in the economic relationship 
(level of trade) and the type of goods and FDI that flow between them. This paper will 
examine the data for causality relationships but the next section first introduces the data 
properly, which is important in understanding the analysis. 
9
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Data
Political distance events data
The political distance variable used throughout this study is comprised of conflict/coop-
eration data from King’s (2003) data-set of Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), 
which is an extension and refinement of the WEIS data set.5 There are more categories of 
conflict and cooperation in IDEA than in WEIS or COPDAB. Monthly bilateral conflict 
and cooperation variables for Japan–China, Japan–United States and United States–China 
were extracted for the period 1990–2004. A net cooperation variable is constructed by 
differencing conflict from cooperation, which is common in the literature, and called 
‘political distance’. 
 Cooperation is represented by positive events or positive political event in a relation-
ship, generally from one country towards another. A report of ‘Japan increasing overseas 
development aid (ODA) to China’ would be a cooperative event from Japan towards China. 
Conflict is represented by a negative political or non-political event such as ‘nation-wide 
protests in China against Japanese interests’ or ‘Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine angers China’. For the net cooperation variable, a value of zero means no event or 
the weighted positive event (cooperation) has cancelled out the equally weighted negative 
event (conflict). 
 The events are machine coded from Reuters Business Briefs using Virtual Research 
Associates (VRA) software and the results are shown to be more accurate and consistent 
than high skill human coders (King and Lowe, 2003). The events covered report most 
actions from one country towards another, including such events categorised as comment, 
consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, propose, reject, accuse, protest, 
deny, demand, warn, threaten and demonstrate. All events are given weights consistent 
with Goldstein (1992) to capture severity and extended from WEIS. 
 The assumption here is that a positive event will to some extent cancel out, or have 
the opposite effect on, a negative effect. The variables are analysed separately to confirm 
the importance of a net measure. Net conflict (conflict minus cooperation as opposed to 
the other way around) is used in other studies (Polachek, 1980; Pollins 1989a).
 Figures 1 and 2 show the net cooperation indexes between Japan and China, and 
China and the United States for the sub-period 2002–2004 to illustrate what the data 
picks up and what the data looks like. The fifteen years from 1990 to 2004 cover many 
events and the sub-period is used here purely for illustration. Cooperation is positive and 
conflict is negative on the vertical axes in Figures 1 and 2. A move in the positive direction 
is a narrowing of political distance as countries become closer politically. A move in the 
10
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negative direction from a conflict event is a widening of political distance.
Some of the peaks and troughs that can be noted from Figure 1 include:
Cooperation
• April 2002: National Peoples’ Congress Chairman Li Peng meets Prime Minister 
Koizumi in Japan.
• August 2003: China and Japan participate and work together in six-party talks to solve 
the North Korean nuclear problem. Also there is news of FDI hitting record highs. 
Conflict
• May 2002: diplomatic rift over North Korean asylum seekers
• July 2002: sunken North Korean ship in East China Sea creates tension between  
Japan and China
• December 2003: 400 Japanese businessmen organise an orgy in South China with 
500 prostitutes. This is significant and shows up as such a large event because of ongoing 
discomfort over the war-time sex slavery.
• March 2004: Japan cuts aid to China by 20 per cent. There are also disputes over 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. These events lead to a cancellation of bilateral talks on a maritime 
treaty.
 Figure 1 shows that the net cooperation index does not appear to pick up one of 
the most important and significant events between the two countries: the Yasukuni Shrine 
visits by Koizumi. The annual visits to the shrine between 2001 and 2006 created a great 
deal of tension as the shrine is supposed to house the spirits of 14 Class A war criminals 
and Koizumi’s visits were very public and were seen by the Chinese public as honouring 
these war criminals. The visits during this sub-period took place on 21 April 2002, 14 
January 2003 and 1 January 2004 but do not show up in the net cooperation index. The 
reason the shrine visits do not register in Figure 1 or in the net cooperation variable used 
in this study, is that the negative reportage of the shrine visit is cancelled out by positive 
cooperation news (such as record high FDI or trade numbers being reported). Indeed, 
if the conflict variable is viewed independently, the shrine visits do show up as significant 
conflict events (see Appendix A). The 2002 and 2003 visits are the most significant and 
the reasons for the 2001 and 2004 visits not showing up strongly even in the conflict data 
in those exact months are explained in Appendix A. 
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Figure 1 Political distance (net cooperation) between Japan and China, 2002-04
Note: Calculated as cumulative positive news scores less cumulative negative news scores. 
Source: King (2003).
 Also common in the literature is the use of relative conflict/cooperation rather than 
absolute conflict/cooperation to control for some countries having more events reported 
than others. Data-sets such as COPDAB which use the New York Times exclusively might 
bias the reporting of US events upwards, and no news source is bias free. Countries like 
the United States will naturally have more events as well, as they are engaged in more 
international activities and have more interactions with other countries. Converting the 
events into a relative measure by dividing the scale by the total number of events is not 
appropriate for this study because it will negate the fact that some countries interact more 
with other countries. 
 Some of the peaks and troughs from the US–China relationship in Figure 2 in-
clude:
Cooperation
• October 2002: China and the United States agree to work together on nuclear 
disarmament of North Korea.
• April 2004: Trade talks result in satisfactory outcome for both countries.
Conflict
• November 2003: Trade dispute leading to US antidumping measures being put 
12
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in place on Chinese TVs, textiles, steel and soy beans (this is shown only as conflict from 
China towards the United States).
• July 2004: reports of avian influenza in China; China announces military manoeuvres 
in the Taiwan Straits and presses the United States to stop arms sales to Taiwan.
Figure 2 Political distance (net cooperation) between China and the United 
States, 2002–04
Note: Calculated as cumulative positive news scores less cumulative negative news scores. 
Source: King (2003).
 The conflict/cooperation data are not perfect and the creation of a net cooperation 
variable to reflect political distance may be inappropriate, as noted previously, as some 
important events do not show up. Also, large events only show up as spikes in the data 
whereas quite often they have lasting consequences. Relying on one news source, as the data 
set used here does, misses news from some countries and over-reports from others. This is 
a difficult problem as Chinese events perhaps have better coverage than other sources, in 
news sources such as the China Daily, but then this data source is also far from bias free. 
Reuters is seen as an acceptable, more international, and bias free wire service than other 
news sources traditionally used such as the New York Times, which is the exclusive source 
for the COPDAB database. WEIS and Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) use a number 
of different sources and are flexible, as they allow coders to specify the data sources. There 
is also difficulty in isolating reporting bias for countries such as the United States as they 
have more international interactions and hence appear in the news the most. 
13
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Trade data
Trade data are monthly and from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. As is common 
practice, import data are used as there is incentive to under-report exports. The data are 
adjusted for seasonality and de-trended to make them into stationary series where neces-
sary and the appropriate tests for unit roots carried out. 
 Two variables are used for trade and compared: nominal, absolute US dollar value trade 
flow from one country to another and a trade index constructed by Hirschman (1945), which is 
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where subscripts i and j on Trade indicate trade from country i to j, Xij is exports from 
country i to j, Mij is imports of country i from j and subscript w indicates world (so Xiw 
is total exports of country i). This shows the importance of country j to country i. 
 Here, Hirschman’s (1945) index of trade is used as it captures both types of inter-
dependence: vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1977) and dependence (Hirschman, 1945). 
This measure is used in other studies (Reuveny and Kang, 1996 and Barbieri, 1996). 
Although this index is useful for capturing aspects of interdependence, a flaw in its use is 
discussed below. The results from using both trade variables are compared.
Granger causality
Granger causality is defined as the past values of one variable being useful in explaining 
the current value of another, given an information set that includes past values of both 
variables (Granger, 1969). A variable X is said to Granger cause a variable Y if lagged 
values of X help explain values of Y. Granger causality is not deep causality but a method 
that can show there exists a relationship between variables.
 The availability of rich monthly data is taken advantage of here and Granger causal-
ity is used to test the hypothesis that there is no Granger causality between trade and the 
net cooperation index. The direction of causality and the lag lengths are expected to be 
different across country pairs as many other factors affect both trade and political relations 
(Gasiorowski and Polachek, 1982; Reuveny and Kang, 1996).
 The model is a vector autoregressive (VAR) model which looks like:
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where T is trade (the index or exports) and C is net cooperation, with the subscript indi-
cating time. 
 There is Granger causality if we reject the null hypothesis of
βi’s = 0 in Equation 1  [political distance will help forecast trade in future]
or
α’i’s = 0 in Equation 2  [trade helps forecast political distance]
 The existence of a third variable which Granger causes both net cooperation and 
trade will give the result that net cooperation Granger causes trade or vice versa when a 
relationship does not exist (Granger 1980; Sims, 1980). Sims (1980) found causality is 
uni-directional from money to income but not vice versa in his famous 1972 paper and 
later showed the addition of the interest rate to the vector auto-regression effectively 
explains away his earlier finding. Here it is difficult to think of another variable that could 
be explaining both variation in the political distance between two countries and variation 
in their trade volumes. A third country’s influence or presence could affect the results 
from time to time during shocks but this would be difficult to capture consistently over 
time and to isolate. The Japan–China relationship could be affected by the involvement 
of European countries, the United States, or even the multilateral landscape in general. 
However, it is a stretch to think of the general trend in news items between two countries 
to be driven by a third country. This study does not analyse the effects of external factors 
on the trade-political distance relationship. 
 Another potential problem that Sims points out is the existence of serial correla-
tion, which can cause problems in this sort of estimation when ‘some elements of optimal 
control enter’ the model (Sims, 1972: 542). If one variable in a bivariate system is chosen 
optimally, the values of that variable become structural elements of the system (Sims, 1972). 
The only sense where that could potentially be a problem in this case is when political 
distance is controlled to influence trade. This is somewhat plausible but the conflict and 
cooperation variables include actions by many actors in each country and events out of 
the control of leaders, governments and authorities. 
 Sims (1972) points out that presence of uni-directional Granger causality can be 
thought of as causality but bi-directional Granger causality shows a feedback mechanism 
and cannot be called causality. As discussed above, it is assumed that there is a bi-directional 
relationship between trade and conflict and cooperation and the results below would seem 
to confirm this. Causality is used to refer to the direction of influence but as in the case of 
Granger causality analysis, it is not deep causality. The aim of this paper is to find a rela-
tionship between political distance and trade or economic interdependence and therefore 
instead of strict causality, finding one variable affects the other is adequate.  
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Why Granger causality and not cross-sectional analysis?
It is common in the literature to find single equation cross-sectional analysis to estimate 
the effect of various measures of trade or interdependence on political distance. Pollins 
(1989a, 1989b) is generally given credit for popularising the estimation of the effect of 
political distance on trade. The recognition of causality running both ways between political 
distance and trade led to many studies estimating simultaneous equations. The problem with 
two stage least squares or three stage least squares estimation in analysing the relationship 
between political distance and trade simultaneously is that exogenous variables are needed 
to identify the equations. Defence expenditure has been used to identify political distance 
and development indicators such as education levels and highway vehicles per capita have 
been used to identify trade (Polachek, 1999). Using defence expenditure may be useful 
when analysing high-intensity conflicts with Data-sets such as MID, but in this study it is 
problematic for the analysis of China–Japan relations. China’s defence expenditure is un-
clear and Japan’s defence expenditure is uniquely constrained constitutionally. Also, there 
have not been any significant military related conflicts and nothing worthy of showing 
up in the MID data set. China also trades a lot more than its level of development would 
suggest, if such indicators were used to identify trade. For these reasons, the most com-
mon variables used to allow a simultaneous equation to work do not perform adequately 
for the case of Japan–China.
 The results below here suggest that cross-section analysis, often only possible with 
annual data and depending on the country pairs, may not capture the true dynamics of 
international trade and political interactions, as reflected in the differing lag structures in 
the results. 
 The advantage of time series methodology is that there is greater freedom in terms 
of finding different lag structures among different bilateral relationships. There are some 
problems with this methodology that Kim and Rousseau (2005) summarise. First, the 
results seem to be sensitive to the number of lags included (Geweke, 1984). Secondly, as 
mentioned, the inclusion of a third variable can alter the results (Granger, 1980; Sims, 
1980). Finally, de-trending a series (in this case the trade data) may lead to different cau-
sality conclusions (Kang, 1985). 
Results
The main results of the Granger causality tests are shown in Tables 1 to 3. An increase 
in the net cooperation index (a narrowing of political distance) in the tables is either an 
increase in cooperation or a decrease in conflict relative to the other variable. ‘Japanese 
net cooperation’ in the tables means a rise, on balance, in reports of positive over events 
16
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
that relate to country Y, where Y is the other country in the bilateral analysis. There is no 
strong evidence of increased conflict causing trade to increase (which does not make sense, 
except in the event of some countervailing action) but there is evidence of cooperation 
(or a reduction in conflict) causing trade to increase. 
 Two tests are carried out. The first is for Granger causality: that the coefficients are 
jointly statistically different to zero. This is testing the joint significance of all β’s in Equa-
tion 1 or joint significance of all α’s in Equation 2 (null: β1= β2= β3=…=0). The statistical 
significance is shown with a star next to the number of lags. The second test is whether 
the sum of the coefficients is statistically different to zero (null: β1+ β2+ β3+…=0). This 
is a test of whether we can confidently claim the long-run multiplier effect of one variable 
on the other is positive or negative, or indeed whether there is any overall statistical effect 
at all. This statistical significance is denoted with a star next to the sum of coefficients. 
 The results in Tables 1 to 3 show the sum of coefficients even if they are not statisti-
cally different to zero, as in many cases the sign is consistent over a number of lags where 
Granger causality was found, and it will show the general trend and is therefore useful in 
interpreting the results. The magnitude of the sum of coefficients is not of great value in 
interpreting the results as they are coefficients between de-trended and differenced trade 
values and an index. In Table 2 they are of less importance as they reflect the correlations 
between two indices. 
 The lag lengths differ for each country pair in the study and this is consistent with 
results in other studies (Reuveny and Kang, 1996). Trade contracts are in general longer 
term than monthly or quarterly, and the effects of large or significant events, good or 
bad, take time to affect trade and investment numbers. The cancellation of most contracts 
cannot be effected immediately and it takes time to initiate trade transactions. Similarly, 
an increase in trade is not followed immediately by cooperative actions or a diminution in 
negative actions because it takes time to report trade and FDI statistics and to respond to 
them. There is a lag in causality and it varies for each relationship. 
 The first result in Table 1 shows that an increase in the index of Chinese net co-
operation towards Japan (Granger) causes Japanese exports to China to increase. This 
can be thought of in a number of ways. As the political climate in China towards Japan 
improves, China is likely to import more from Japan. Another interpretation is that as the 
political climate in China improves towards Japan, Japanese companies are likely to be 
more confident and inclined to sign contracts to supply to the Chinese market.6 
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Table 1 Trade and net cooperation, 1990–2004
Japan–China Lags Sum of coefficients
a. Japanese exports to China  7*** 13.55 
     = f(Chinese net cooperation) 8*** 8.72 
 9** 6.88 
 10*** 12.80 
 11** 5.87 
 12** 0.55 
  
b. Japanese net cooperation  12* -0.024 
     = f(Chinese exports to Japan) 13* -0.019 
 14* -0.023
China–United States Lags Sum of coefficients
c. US net cooperation   11* -0.036** 
     = f(Chinese exports to United States) 12* -0.043** 
 13** -0.032* 
 14** -0.028 
 15** -0.035* 
 16** -0.044** 
 17** -0.038 
  
d. Chinese exports to United States 6* -2.48 
     = f(Chinese net cooperation) 9* -3.57  
 
e. US net cooperation 2** -0.014** 
     = f(US exports to China) 3** -0.012* 
 4* -0.014** 
 5*** -0.017*** 
 6** -0.018*** 
 7** -0.018** 
 8** -0.013* 
 13** -0.008 
 19** -0.004
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Japan-United States Lags Sum of coefficients
f. Japanese net cooperation  3* 0.005 
     = f(Japanese exports to United States) 4* -0.001 
 10* -0.023 
 11* -0.026 
 12** -0.020 
 13* -0.015 
 
g. US exports to Japan  14** 3.60* 
     = f(Japanese net cooperation) 15** 3.61* 
 16** 2.37 
 17** 2.17 
 18** 1.81  
 
h. US exports to Japan 3** 2.31 
     = f(US net cooperation) 4* 2.54 
 5* 2.89 
 6* 3.47*
Notes: * = 10 per cent level of significance, ** = 5 per cent level of significance and 
*** = 1 per cent level of significance. Statistical significance on the lag number 
signifies joint statistical significance of all the lags from one lag up to that number 
(presence of Granger causality) and significance on the sum of coefficients is a 
test whether the sum of all the lags is significant.   
  
 The second Japan–China result (Table 1b) is that increasing Chinese exports to 
Japan help explain a fall in the index of cooperation from Japan towards China. Increased 
Japanese imports of Chinese goods after 12 months can be seen to worsen the climate in 
Japan towards China. This is consistent with what the media often refers to as the ‘China 
fear’ in Japan of industry hollowing out and jobs being lost to China as well as Japan’s fear 
of losing its economic dominance in the region. Table 3 (p. 181) below shows stronger 
evidence of this result, which supports realist hypotheses of trade sometimes increasing 
political distance. 
 The United States–China results show strong evidence that trade flows reduce net 
cooperation (widen political distance) in the United States towards China. The sum of 
the coefficients is mostly statistically significant and both an increase in Chinese exports 
to the United States and United States exports to China cause the United States’ stance 
towards China to worsen. 
 Finally for Table 1, that Japanese exports to the United States help explain a reduc-
tion in the Japanese net cooperation index towards the United States is unexpected (Table 
1f). The sum of the lag coefficients is very small and closer inspection of the data shows 
a mix of positive and negative coefficients for different lags.7 The other results (Table 1g 
and h) show increases in the index of cooperation in both directions, which helps explain 
increased United States trade to Japan. 
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 In Table 1b Chinese exports to Japan were explaining falls in Japanese net coopera-
tion (or increasing political distance) towards China; in Table 2a an increase in China’s 
dependence on Japan helps explain the opposite effect, a positive movement on the net 
cooperation scale and the countries becoming politically closer. The results are not incon-
sistent, as the dependence index used here captures the increasing importance of Japan 
for China, reflected in its rising dependence and vulnerability in relation to Japan. This 
nuanced story is only picked up with the use of both the nominal export variable and the 
trade index of dependence. 
 The results of increased Japanese dependence on China are mixed (Table 2b). 
Although one could interpret the change in sign after 13 months, from a negative to a 
positive effect on Japan’s stance towards China, as the change over time of the effect of 
Japan’s integration with China on the country as a whole, the sum of the coefficients is 
not statistically significant and the results cannot be interpreted as confidently as other 
results. All that can be said is that Japanese dependence on China Granger causes a change 
in political distance. 
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Table 2 Interdependence and net cooperation, 1990–2004
Japan–China Lags Sum of coefficients
a. Japanese net cooperation  5** 810 
 = f(Chinese dependence on Japan) 6** 1264** 
  7** 1516** 
  8*** 2244*** 
  9** 2323*** 
  10** 1983** 
  11** 2719** 
  12** 2025* 
  13** 2735* 
 
b. Japanese net cooperation  12* -752 
 = f(Japanese dependence on China) 13* -180 
  14* 286 
  15* 622 
 
c. Japanese dependence on China  2* -0.00012 
 = f(Japanese net cooperation)
Japan–US Lags Sum of coefficients
d. Japanese net cooperation 6** 5313*** 
 = f(Japanese dependence on United States)  7** 6173*** 
  8** 7790*** 
  9** 8320*** 
 
e. US net cooperation 6** 2918 
 = f(Japanese dependence on United States)  18** 15380*** 
  19** 14835** 
  20** 18568*** 
  21** 24198*** 
  22*** 28415*** 
 
f. US net cooperation 2* 418** 
 = f(US dependence on Japan) 3*** 581*** 
  4*** 602*** 
  5* 542*** 
  6* 517**
Notes: * = 10 per cent level of significance, ** = 5 per cent level of significance and 
*** = 1 per cent level of significance. Statistical significance on the lag number 
signifies joint statistical significance of all the lags from one lag up to that number 
(presence of Granger causality) and significance on the sum of coefficients is a 
test whether the sum of all the lags is significant.   
  
 The Granger causality estimations carried out on interdependence and cooperation, 
using the trade index, do not include the United States–China case because the highly 
unbalanced trade relationship distorts the trade index.8
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 The results showing a positive relationship between net cooperation and dependence 
for Japan and the United States are strong (Table 2d, e and f). There is uni-directional 
causality from dependence to political distance showing that mutual interdependence 
fosters cooperation and narrows political distance — the classic liberal hypothesis. 
 As the causality, direction of causality and lag lengths vary by country pair, it is rea-
sonable to assume that even within a country pair the dynamics and interactions change 
over time. To take account of, and to test for this, two additional steps are taken. First, to 
test whether the longer term relationships in Tables 1 and 2 are consistent over time, or 
whether the pattern (or even nature) of the interactions changes over time, the fifteen-year 
period was split roughly into half. In order to keep the number of observations high, the 
eight and seven-year split represents the only sub-periods analysed. Table 3 shows that the 
results are significantly different between the two time sub-periods. 
 Table 3 reveals more evidence of the existence of a trade-cooperation nexus, which 
is perhaps hidden in the longer series. It is interesting to note there is a stronger link 
between trade and political distance in the period 1998–2004 while there is a stronger 
dependence-political distance link in the earlier period 1990–1997. For example, there is 
no evidence found of Granger causality between trade dependence and political distance 
in the period 1998–2004. The result from Table 1a, that Chinese net cooperation towards 
Japan Granger causes Japanese exports to China is present in both periods in Table 3a 
but with ambiguity of the sign of the effect. Analysis of the longer time period may better 
capture the long-term underlying direction of the effect, if there is one at all. 
 The most significant result is that an increase in Japanese net cooperation towards 
China appears to lift Japanese exports to China (Table 3c). This is the equivalent to saying 
an increase in conflict from Japan towards China Granger causes a reduction in Japanese 
exports to China. Again, the sum of coefficients is not significantly different to zero but is 
consistently positive and well above the magnitude of the individual lag coefficients, which 
range from 1.8 to 13 in this case. 
 The other result from Table 1b, that Chinese exports to Japan are causing the 
measure of conflict from Japan to China to rise, is confirmed in Table 3b but with evi-
dence only found in the latter period. It is reasonable to expect that the ‘China fear’ that 
is a product of China’s rise is more pronounced in the second period analysed as China 
became a much bigger player internationally and in trade with Japan, and the direct threat 
to Japan’s regional dominance became more apparent. 
 The main Japan–China result from Table 2a, that growing Chinese dependence on 
Japan is causing Japanese net cooperation towards China to rise, is also found in Table 3i 
but is only apparent in the earlier period.
 The nuanced story from Table 1 can be extended to: Japanese net cooperation 
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towards China is positively affected in the earlier period by Japan’s growing importance 
to China and negatively affected in the latter period by the growing exports of China to 
Japan, as China’s dominance grows and becomes more visible. 
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Table 3 Japan–China trade/interdependence and net cooperation by sub periods, 
1990–1997 and 1998–2004
 1997-1997 1998–2004
Trade and Net Cooperation Lags Sum coeffs Lags Sum coeffs
a. Japanese exports to China 7**  6.30 2*  -0.79 
     = f(Chinese net cooperation) 8**  -1.35 3*  -0.54 
  9**  -0.73 7*  22.12 
  10***  6.48 12**  8.85 
  16*  -12.0 13*  7.44 
 
b. Japanese net cooperation   12*  -0.07*** 
     = f(Chinese exports to Japan)    13*  -0.06** 
    14**  -0.08*** 
    15**  -0.08*** 
    16*  -0.07** 
 
c. Japanese exports to China   12***  24.7 
     = f(Japanese net cooperation)   13**  25.4 
    14**  20.5 
    15**  22.4 
    16*  22.5 
 
d. Japanese net cooperation   13*  -0.16* 
     = f(Japanese exports to China) 
 
e. Chinese net cooperation 22**  0.317 2*  0.003 
     = f(Japanese exports to China) 23*  0.220 4*  -0.006 
  24*  0.358 5**  0.003 
    6*  -0.002 
 
f. Chinese exports to Japan 11*  26.7***  
     = f(Japanese net cooperation) 
 
g. Chinese net cooperation 6**  0.030 6*  0.002 
     = f(Chinese exports to Japan)  7**  0.027 
  8*  0.034 
  12*  0.111** 
  13*   0.126** 
  15*  0.181*** 
h. Chinese exports to Japan   17**  5.44 
     = f(Chinese net cooperation)   18*  6.37 
    19*  11.18 
    20*  10.59
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 1990–1997 1998–2004
Dependence and Net Cooperation Lags Sum coeffs Lags Sum coeffs
i. Japanese net cooperation 2*  -374  – 
     = f(Chinese dependence on Japan) 3**  -866 
 4*  -466 
 5**  54 
 6***  985 
 7**  1069 
 8**  1719 
 9**  1696 
 10*  1733 
 11*  2279 
 12*  1672 
 
j. Chinese dependence on Japan 3**  -0.0002  – 
     = f(Chinese net cooperation)   
 
k. Chinese net cooperation 20**  3942*  – 
     = f(Chinese dependence on Japan) 21**  4140   
 22***  5678* 
 23***  6397* 
 24**  6198 
 
l. Chinese net cooperation 8*  1991*  – 
     = f(Japanese dependence on China) 20**  4851* 
 21*   3985 
 22*  4201 
 23*  3738
Notes: * = 10 per cent level of significance, ** = 5 per cent level of significance and 
*** = 1 per cent level of significance. Statistical significance on the lag number 
signifies joint statistical significance of all the lags from one lag up to that number 
(presence of Granger causality) and significance on the sum of coefficients is a 
test whether the sum of all the lags is significant.  
Net cooperation as the appropriate measure of political distance
The net cooperation variable used in this study follows the seminal papers of Polachek 
(1980) and Pollins (1989a). Other studies use only conflict and it could be argued a 
ratio of cooperation to conflict could pick up different dynamics between conflict and 
cooperation and not restrict it to one functional form. It is reasonable to assume that it 
is not conflict (negative news) alone, or cooperation (positive news) that drives trade, 
but the net effect of both. To subtract conflict from cooperation imposes the assumption 
that they are additive and that the reporting of certain events cancels out the reporting 
of others. One approach might be to test the robustness of the results with the ratio of 
cooperation to conflict. This, however, is difficult as there are frequent zero values in the 
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news events, where no positive or negative news item was reported in that month for 
the bilateral relationship. Also, despite the fact that this would test another shape of the 
relationship between cooperation and conflict, and its relationship with trade, it seems 
more appropriate to think of cooperation and conflict as additive, as positive and negative 
utility towards another country. 
 The Granger causality tests from Tables 1 and 2 were repeated but with conflict 
and cooperation separately. While some results confirm the results in Tables 1 and 2, and 
even some in Table 3, a majority of results were not consistent and did not make sense 
with what is observed in reality. These inconclusive results suggest that in analysing the 
relationship between political distance and trade, it does not make sense to look at only 
the positives or only the negatives of political distance, in isolation from each other. 
Implications
The three relationships covered here include neighbours (Japan and China), rivals (the 
United States and China; China and Japan), allies (the United States and Japan), democ-
racies and a one-party state. No generalisations are made about the characteristics of the 
countries and their effect on the trade–political distance relationship as is done elsewhere 
— there is often a lack of sensible bounds on conclusions and results are generalised across 
time and countries (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001).
 The results in this study are not completely consistent with Reuveny and Kang 
(1996). Reuveny and Kang find that causality tends to be reciprocal, whereas in this study 
causality seems to be uni-directional when only applying the linear results that they use. 
The conclusion Reuveny and Kang draw that the pattern of the interaction between politics 
and economics differs for each country relationship is, however, supported by this study.
 There is evidence in the present study that supports both the liberal and realist schools. 
The findings are consistent with the theories described previously of low-intensity conflict 
in a relationship underpinned by strong economics, of enduring rivalries and neighbourly 
disputes that are mitigated by trade (Robst et al., 2006). The structure of Japan–China 
relations at this point makes them relatively low-intensity in the generation of conflict. 
The Japan–China relationship
This analysis leads to a number of important conclusions. The economic relationship 
underpins the relationship between China and Japan, and the results here show that the 
economic relationship constrains the political relationship. This result is in direct contrast 
to a study by Hughes and He (2006), which concluded that the pacifying effects of trade 
(as posited by liberal theories) are dominated by nationalism in the case of Japan–China 
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relations. 
 Yasukuni Shrine is the most talked about issue and is most symbolic of the difficul-
ties between Japan and its largest neighbours, China and South Korea. In a sign of the 
recognition of the importance of the relationship, Prime Minster Abe did not visit the 
shrine while he was leader and in the contest for leadership after Abe, Fukuda, who even-
tually won the contest, gave a clear message that in order to mend relations with Asian 
neighbours, a Yasukuni Shrine visit would not take place.9 Recognition of the implications 
of shrine visits is now clear and even if future leaders do seek to increase political tensions 
for domestic political reasons, it would appear these actions would be taken in a manner 
so as to minimise the damage to Japan–China relations.10 As the results here suggest, 
politics or variations in political distance do appear to have an effect on the bilateral trade 
relationship and trade affects political distance (See Table 1a and 1b; Table 3a, b and c). 
 There is some evidence of increased low-intensity conflict from Japan towards China 
as Chinese trade to Japan increases, but this can be explained by the underlying economic 
relationship’s being strong enough that the Japanese leaders and some actors in the 
economy can cause low-intensity conflict for domestic political reasons. This is consistent 
with the media reports of ‘China fear’ and with the findings of Robst et al. (2006) and 
Gartzke (1998). Tensions may rise significantly if trade started to become unbalanced as 
in the United States–China case. The Japan–China trade relationship is currently relatively 
balanced and a growing Japanese deficit with China would have to be managed carefully 
to dampen tensions and rising nationalism between the two countries.  
 Thus, these low-intensity conflicts between Japan and China would seem unlikely 
to escalate as the countries become more integrated economically, unless trade becomes 
largely lopsided. Increased trade, and also investment, have meant that both forms of 
interdependence, vulnerability and dependence, have grown. The increased vulnerability 
of one country towards the other and the unresolved historical issues complicate and fuel 
domestic sentiments in some segments of both countries and from time to time it would 
appear that both governments play these up for domestic political gain. 
 Hughes and He (2006) state that the economic interdependence between Japan 
and China is a weaker factor than nationalism and that although increased economic in-
terdependence has increased the cost of conflict, the risk of escalation has increased. The 
results in this current study would suggest otherwise.
 The results of this study suggest that Japanese exports to China are increasingly af-
fected by Japanese political distance from China (Tables 1a, 3a and 3c). A rise in negative 
Chinese sentiments towards Japan and increasingly a rise in Japan’s negative sentiments 
towards China adversely affect Japanese exports.11 Japan’s politicians are increasingly 
constrained in actions that might affect China and Chinese sentiments.   
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 The economic relationship is now being driven by market forces and not significantly 
directed by policy intervention (Drysdale, 2007) as the highly complementary industrial 
structures and proximity of both countries drive the growth in trade. And the politics affect 
the economic relationship in some areas more than others, as some Japanese companies feel 
they are global brands that can de-link themselves from their country of origin (Armstrong, 
2007). However, the Chinese economy, especially after WTO accession, is much more of 
a level playing field for companies from Japan, the United States and Europe and Japan’s 
advantage of being in China early is diminishing rapidly. The evidence of Japanese net 
cooperation affecting Japanese exports to China after 1998 shows that it is important for 
Japanese actors in the Chinese economy not to have to carry Japanese political baggage in 
competing with others in that market (Armstrong, 2007). The interaction between politics 
and trade would appear to be more pronounced in the later period analysed. Since this 
period saw rapid economic growth it can be concluded that it caused an improvement in 
political distance. 
 As the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries becomes even 
more important than it already is, its effect on the politics between the two countries is 
likely to grow. The period since late 2006 has seen political tensions ease with visits by 
both leaders to the other country and efforts from both governments to resolve some 
important issues. Significant examples include the joint experts commission set up to agree 
on disputed interpretations of history and an agreement to pursue jointly, and eventu-
ally commit to, a bilateral trade agreement (free trade agreement or a broader economic 
partnership agreement). 
 It is possible that when significant negative events are reported and political distance 
is seen to be widening, there are some actors in each country that would try and cancel 
these out with positive events. For example, the Chinese and Japanese governments have 
created second-track dialogue forums (the Beijing Tokyo Forum, for example) and in-
creased grass roots exchanges. The period of rising tensions from 2001 also saw positive 
cooperation events increase from China’s WTO entry. The net effect was that the news 
and closer economic ties from China’s WTO entry cancelled out the negative political 
news. 
Further work
Economic relationships between countries involve a lot more than just trade in goods. An 
obvious next step would be to undertake a similar systematic study that included services 
trade. Also of particular importance in the China–Japan relationship is foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) as it is a big part of the relationship and is likely to be equally responsive 
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to the political climate, if not more so. 
 Another extension the analysis is to take account of multilateral, or third party, ef-
fects of political distance and trade. It is not difficult to see why the influence of the United 
States could have an effect on Japan–China trade, or that as the political distance between 
Japan and China increases, trade through Hong Kong or other countries will increase. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to test whether there is any relationship between trade and 
political distance, and the direction of its causality in the Japan–China relationship. The 
interactions of both countries with the United States were analysed by way of comparison. 
The study uses the latest events data available (up to 2004) with high frequency (monthly) 
data.
  The main results are that a narrowing of political distance helps explain an increase 
in Japanese exports to China; in the 1990–1997 period; growth in Japan’s importance 
to China increases Japanese cooperation towards China; and in the 1998–2004 period 
an increase in Japanese cooperation towards China helps explain an increase in Japanese 
exports to China. Chinese imports of Japanese products do not appear to be independent 
of how well the countries are getting along. 
 Growing Chinese exports to Japan and the United States are causing a rise in the 
measure of negative sentiment towards China, but the growth of Japanese trade to China 
dampens this effect. The large imbalance in the trade relationship between China and the 
United States is causing tensions to rise in the United States from increased trade in both 
directions. 
 The stable and rapidly growing economic relationship, of which trade flows are a big 
part, constrain political behaviour between China and Japan. The rising interdependence 
between the nations and concomitant opportunity cost of serious conflict has led to an 
easing of political tensions and even some narrowing of political distance. The structure 
of the political relationship appears likely, from this analysis, to be increasingly affected by 
the economic relationship.
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Notes
1 See Mansfield and Pollins (2003) for a review of the literature.
2 Here the use of ‘conflict’ and ‘cooperation’ is in terms of political conflict and political cooperation. 
Trade tensions (such as trade disputes) are part of political conflict and act to widen political 
distance. Conflict and cooperation widen and narrow economic distance by widening and narrowing 
political distance. 
3 For a discussion of this see Mansfield and Pollins (2001).
4 For a discussion of the literature, including empirical studies, see Polachek and Seiglie (2006).
5 Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/events/
6 It could be argued that the political climate in China towards Japan will be affected by the political 
climate in Japan towards China.
7 The coefficients of each lag are not reported here as they are in some other papers (Sims, 1972) 
because the sheer amount of data and the relationships for which they may be interesting (Japan-
United States) are not the main aim of this paper. 
8 Hirschman’s index of trade dependence does not perform well for highly unbalanced trade or rapidly 
growing imbalances in trade. The direction of trade is irrelevant in the index so it does not treat 
China’s growing surplus (the United States’ growing deficit) as trade increasing in one direction. As 
the theories and literature tell us, it is the asymmetry in trade, or the growing imbalance, that is the 
driver of conflict and so the index would only appear to perform well for trade that is relatively even. 
9 There has been increasing talk of either removing the souls of the 14 Class A war criminals from 
Yasukuni, or failing that technically, creating another memorial for Japan’s war dead that does not 
include the war criminals. 
10 This could also be the case with other economically important yet politically sensitive relations such 
as between Japan and South Korea. 
11 Here and at other times the measured events which cover all news items are used as a proxy for 
sentiment.
12 http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/09/17/isles.t_4.php
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Appendix
Appendix A Conflict data for Japan–China
Table 4 Conflict data from China towards Japan
Month→ 
Year↓ Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total
1990 0 5 0 0 10.4 2.2 5.1 0 0 9.9 0 0 32.6 
1991 4 0.1 0 0 0 9.8 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 14 
1992 0 0 9.2 5 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 14.4 
1993 0 11.1 9.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 20.5 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.5 7.1 0 0 27.6 
1995 8.8 0 17.7 4.9 0 2.2 0 4.9 8.7 0 9.3 0 56.5 
1996 4.9 0 0 6 0 2.2 12 12.3 36.2 7.4 0 6.7 87.7 
1997 0 4 0 2.3 9.1 12 0.1 9.3 8.5 0 0 0 45.3 
1998 0 0 0 0.1 5.2 17.2 0 5 2.3 8 10.3 0 48.1 
1999 0 0 0 0.1 2.3 0 3 0 0.1 0 4.9 0 10.4 
2000 5 3 4 6.2 2.2 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 6.4 29 
2001 0 9 3 13 21.2 7.6 9.4 0.2 4.9 0 4 8.2 80.5 
2002 9.9 4.9 0 19.9 12.4 0 0 4.9 4 0 7 0 63 
2003 11.2 0 0 4.9 0 0 0 14.2 8.8 4.9 0 0.1 44.1 
2004 0 0 14.2 2.2 0 4.4 4.6 3 0 8 2.2 10.6 49.2
Notes: Shaded months indicate a Yasukuni shrine visit by Prime Minister Koizumi. The 
first visit, in 2001, was preceded by an announcement in May that year which 
got all the press. The visit itself was not reported so prominently and did not 
cause as much negative news as in May perhaps because Koizumi gave in to 
Chinese pressure in August and did not visit the shrine on the highly significant 
anniversary of the end of the war, 15 August, but instead on 13 August. The visit 
on 2004 happened on New Year’s day when it is tradition for Japanese to visit 
shrines and temples and this could be the reason it was not reported as a negative 
event. Indeed, there is much less news coverage of this visit than the others. 
 
The largest conflict month is September 1996 with a score of 36.2. This is when 
Japan, China and Taiwan all claimed ownership of uninhibited islands in the 
East China Sea, thought to have oil. From the International Herald Tribune: 
‘Japan's persistent moves to assert sovereignty over the islands, known as the 
Senkakus in Japanese and the Diaoyus in Chinese, have whipped up a storm of 
nationalist fervour by angering Chinese in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau 
— despite their political differences. But analysts say that the main reason Japan 
and China will continue to press their claims, even at the risk of confrontation, 
is that both countries want access to energy resources close to their shores.’ (17 
September 1996).
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Table 5 Conflict data from Japan towards China
Month→ 
Year↓ Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total
1990 0.1 0 3 0 0.1 0.1 8.8 0 0 14 0 0 26.1 
1991 0.2 0 0 0 2.4 4.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 
1992 9.8 2.4 0 4.4 4.4 2.4 4.4 14.4 0 0 0 0 42.2 
1993 12.2 0 0 0 0 4.9 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 17.2 
1994 0 0 0.1 0 4.9 0.1 2.2 4.9 4.1 15.5 0 0 31.8 
1995 0 0 0 4 4.6 2.3 4.2 22.4 0.1 0 0 6.6 44.2 
1996 0 5.9 18.8 0 2.3 6.3 4.6 0.1 8.3 1 0 4.4 51.7 
1997 0 8.9 0 0 0 4.4 4.9 4 0 0 4.9 9.2 36.3 
1998 0 0 0 0 7.6 9.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.9 
1999 0.2 5 0 0 0 4.9 0.1 2.4 4 0 0.1 0 16.7 
2000 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 9.3 0 14.8 0 0 24.3 
2001 0 0 12.8 10.4 0 4.3 0 0 0 4.9 8 12.5 52.9 
2002 9 0 8.1 4 27.6 0 16.3 0 2.3 0 0 0 67.3 
2003 4.9 0 4 0 10.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 18.1 41.7 
2004 0 0 26.8 5 0 0 2.2 0.3 0 0 4.8 14 53.1
Note: Total conflict from China towards Japan was 623 units and total conflict from 
Japan towards China was 530 units over the period
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